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MULTIPLE LOCATION AND  
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY
Nikk Effingham
This paper discusses how the possibility of multi-located entities can resolve 
problems both with the Trinity (i.e., there being one God and three divine 
people, or the Father knowing things that the numerically identical Son does 
not) and with the existence of souls.
Something is multi-located if and only if it is exactly located at two or 
more places at the same time. Hudson1 and Pruss2 have already discussed 
how multi-location can solve certain Christian theological difficulties. This 
paper adds to that corpus by bringing multi-location to bear, primarily, on 
the Doctrine of the Trinity, and, secondarily, on issues to do with substance 
dualism.
Sections 1 and 2 discuss the Doctrine of the Trinity. Section 1 introduces 
some basic ideas about the metaphysics of multi-location and shows how 
they can solve an initial problem with the Doctrine: that God both does 
and does not know the day of Judgement; section 2 then extends these 
thoughts about multi-location to provide a Latin understanding of the 
Trinity. By the end of those two sections I will have demonstrated that at 
least one defence of understanding the Trinity is available to the Christian.
Section 3 shows how similar moves can be made with regards to our 
souls: we are entities multi-located both in spacetime (and so are physical) 
and some atemporal realm (and so are also substance dualistic souls). 
This helps both with making substance dualism consistent with the find-
ings of contemporary science and with making the theory consistent with 
scripture.
I. The Trinity and Multi-Location
1.1 The Trinity
The Doctrine of the Trinity holds that God is three different people (the Fa-
ther, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) as laid down in the Athanasian Creed. 
1Hud Hudson, “Multiple Location and Singular Location Resurrection,” in How Do We 
Survive Our Death? Personal Identity and Resurrection, ed. G Gasser (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010).
2Alexander Pruss, “The Eucharist,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, ed. 
Thomas Flint and Michael Rea (Oxford: OUP, 2009).
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Start with one immediate problem: in Matthew 24:36, Jesus says of the 
Day of Judgement: “But concerning that day and hour no one knows, not 
even the angels of heaven, nor the Son, but the Father only.” Given that, 
we should believe:
Incompatible Knowledge (IK): The Father knows something that the 
Son does not know yet the Father is numerically identical to the Son.
It appears, at first blush, to be contradictory (what I call a “prima facie con-
tradiction”).
1.2 Chorology
If God were multi-located, IK would not be a contradiction. To explain 
why, first introduce a “chorology” (that is, a system concerning location).3 
Take the relation “__ is exactly located at spatial region __ (at time __)” as 
a primitive (usually the temporal relativization will be kept implicit). Use 
the following examples to ostensively define it:
The cube is exactly located at just one cube-shaped region.
The Kuiper Belt is exactly located at a scattered region composed of lots 
of non-overlapping asteroid shaped regions.
A sphere is exactly located at some region with a volume equal to 4π/3 
multiplied by the radius (of the sphere) cubed.
Define two more chorological terms:
x is partially located at r =df r is a sub-region of a region x is exactly 
located at.
x is multi-located =df there are two or more distinct regions that x is 
exactly located at.4
3This chorological system given here is basically that offered by Gilmore and McDaniel 
(although McDaniel terms it “occupation” instead of “exact location”). See Cody Gilmore, 
“Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime,” Philosophy Compass 3:6 (2013), 1228 
and Kris McDaniel, “Extended Simples,” Philosophical Studies (2007), 131–141. Alternative 
chorological systems include those by Parsons and Hudson. See Josh Parsons, “Theories of 
Location,” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3 (2007), 201–232 and Hud Hudson, The Metaphysics 
of Hyperspace (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 97–122. 
4Don’t confuse multi-location, as defined here, with the multi-location of enduring 
objects. I give a list of people who cash out endurantism in terms of multi-location in “En-
durantism and Perdurantism,” in Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, ed. Robert Barnard 
and Neil Manson (London: Continuum, 2012). The brand of multi-location that an enduring 
entity engages in is atemporal multi-location: bearing the atemporal exact location relation to 
multiple spacetime regions. Here we are relying on a different primitive (temporally rela-
tivised exact location) and, therefore, a different brand of multi-location (namely temporally 
relativised multi-location). I’ll return to this distinction in section 2.6.
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A good example of multi-location would be that of a time traveller5 
(admittedly, this works only if time travel is possible but, following other 
authors, I set this worry aside as it seems logically possible6 and there 
are good reasons for further thinking it physically possible7). Imagine 
that eight-year-old Marty is 4' tall at 8:59 a.m. on November 5th 1976, 
and seventeen-year-old Marty is 6' tall on November 5th 1985. Intent on 
preventing his younger self from setting fire to a rug, and causing a con-
flagration in his house, seventeen-year-old Marty time travels to 9 a.m. 
November 5th 1976. Thus, the following is true:
Marty’s Height (MH): Marty is 6' tall (at 9 a.m. on 5.11.76) and 4' tall (at 
9 a.m. on 5.11.76).
If MH is true, multi-location must be possible since geometric proper-
ties of objects, like size and shape, supervene on the geometric properties 
of the regions they are exactly located at e.g., a cube must be exactly lo-
cated at a cube-shaped region, a sphere at a sphere shaped region etc.8 As 
Marty is 4' tall, he must be exactly located at a 4' tall region. As Marty is 
6' tall, he must be exactly located at a 6' tall region. Ergo Marty is exactly 
located at two distinct regions. So if MH is true, multi-location is possible.
1.3 Resolving Prima Facie Contradictions
Already we can see how multi-location bears on problems arising from 
the Doctrine. MH, like IK, is a prima facie contradiction. If MH is true 
when Marty is multi-located, then IK could be true were God to be multi-
located. Just as Marty would both believe that setting fire to rugs is an 
excellent source of entertainment (as his past self believes) and that it very 
much is not (as his future self believes), God can both know and not know 
certain things.
This is, of course, if MH is true. Certainly, as it stands, it’s not a contra-
diction, for in (classical) logic it isn’t of the form Fa & ~Fa, instead being of 
the (clearly non-contradictory) form Fa & Ga. A contradiction arises only 
if we also accept, as a suppressed premise, that if x is 4' tall (at t ) then it 
5See also: Gilmore, “Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime”; Fraser MacBride 
“Where are Particulars and Universals?,” Dialectica 52 (1998), 222–223; Pruss, “The Eucha-
rist,” 526; and Thomas Sattig, The Language and Reality of Time (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 50. 
6Paul Horwich, Asymmetries in Time (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987) and David Lewis, 
“The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976), 145–152. 
7Kurt Gödel, “An Example of a New Type of Cosmological Solutions of Einstein’s Field 
Equations of Gravitation,” Reviews of Modern Physics 21 (1949), 447–450; J. Richard Gott, Time 
Travel in Einstein’s Universe: The Physical Possibilities of Travel Through Time (London: Orion 
Books, 2001); Seth Lloyd et al., “Quantum Mechanics of Time Travel through Post-selected 
Teleportation,” Physical Review D 84 (2011), 025007; Michael Morris et al., “Wormholes, Time 
Machines, and the Weak Energy Condition,” Physical Review Letters 61 (1988), 1446–1449; 
Frank Tipler, “Rotating Cylinders and the Possibility of Global Causality Violation,” Physical 
Review D 9 (1974), 2203–2206.
8McDaniel, “Extended Simples,” 135; Bradford Skow, “Are Shapes Intrinsic?,” Philosoph-
ical Studies 133 (2007), 111–130.
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isn’t the case that x is 6' tall (at t )—and, while that’s true of things in non-
time travel scenarios, I take the Marty situation to show that it is false in 
cases of multi-location. (Carroll argues likewise, and my arguments in this 
section are very similar to his.9)
Note, though, that the conditional statement is true of the different ver-
sions of Marty—the same version of Marty can never be both 4' and 6' tall 
i.e., his past version is 4' tall and not 6' tall; his future version is 6' and not 
4'. “Versions” of multi-located entities will do a lot of work in the sequel, 
and there are many interesting questions we might have about them (e.g., 
should we reify them? if so, should they be identified with temporal parts? 
or temporal parts of life events?10 or should we be anti-realists about them?). 
I offer no answers, though. You might thereby worry that my explanation 
of the Trinity is pointless, for without a metaphysics of the versions that I 
will appeal to throughout, I’ve not given a complete explanation of how to 
resolve the mystery of the Trinity. However, while it’s true that, in failing 
to give you the metaphysical story behind versions (e.g., whether we’re 
ontologically committed to them; if so, what are they?) I’ve failed to give 
a complete story of the most fundamental facts explaining the Trinity, that 
doesn’t mean that what I say doesn’t do anything to explain the mystery 
of the Trinity. Compare: our current ignorance of the fundamental nature 
of electrons (are they, fundamentally, superstrings? are they charged 
in virtue of some true statement about quantum fields?) is no threat to 
electrons playing a role in a useful and informative explanation of the 
chemical properties of carbon. Analogously: prima facie contradictions like 
IK make the Doctrine, at first, seems unintelligible; by showing that such 
prima facie contradictions are true of multi-located Marty, and showing 
how God can be multi-located like Marty is, we make the Trinity intel-
ligible (even if more remains to be said, and that parts of the theory could 
be subject to further metaphysical inquiry). My central aim is only to make 
transparent what is currently opaque, and show that the Doctrine of the 
Trinity isn’t as openly contradictory as it, at first, appears; my aim is not to 
tell the one true, fundamental story about what is going on.
1.4 The Deviant Stature Approach
Someone might deny MH. For it to fail to be true, both conjuncts must fail to 
be true (for it’d be arbitrary to think only one fails to be true) such that, e.g.:
Marty’s Height—Left Conjunct (MHLC): Marty is 4' tall at 9 a.m., 5th 
November 1976.
fails to be true. Call this the “Deviant Stature Approach,” as it raises odd 
questions about Marty’s height.
9John Carroll, “Self Visitation, Traveller Time, and Compatible Properties,” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 42 (2012), 359–370.
10Brian Leftow, “A Latin Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004), 304–333, reprinted in A 
Reader in Contemporary Philosophical Theology, ed. by Oliver Crisp (London: T&T Clark, 2009). 
References are to the reprint. 
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There’s no motivation for thinking MHLC takes some third truth value, 
or lacks a truth value, for situations where it’s reasonable to say that sort 
of thing—e.g., cases of vagueness—are nothing like the situation we have 
here. Nor does it seems right to think MHLC is meaningless—after all, all 
other assertions about height are meaningful, so why not this one? So for 
MH to be false, MHLC must be false.
The falsity of MHLC must arise either because every sentence of that ilk 
is false or because MHLC has a time traveller as its subject. If it’s the former 
then no-one has any height at any time, which is absurd. So statements 
like MHLC must be true except when they feature multi-located entities 
like, e.g., time travellers standing next to themselves. But that’s equally 
absurd: we could then only be sure of someone’s height if we were sure 
that their later or future selves weren’t travelling in time. But it’s bizarre 
to think I should harbour doubts about, say, Barack Obama being 6' 1" un-
less I’ve scoured the universe to make sure his eight-year-old 4' self hasn’t 
fallen through a rift in time. A referee objected to this, saying that my own 
theory is just as bad as I can’t say Obama isn’t 4' tall for the same reason. 
But my theory permits me to be sure of some height based propositions 
(e.g., Obama’s being 6'1") even if others (e.g., Obama’s not being 4' tall) 
are thrown into doubt. As the alternative is that all height based proposi-
tions are thrown into doubt, and knowing some propositions about height 
is better than none, my theory wins out (and note that the propositions 
I know—being the positive propositions about what height someone is 
rather than what height someone isn’t—are the more important ones). In 
short: denying MH leaves us with absurd consequences. So we should 
think that, in multi-location cases, sentences like MH and IK can be true.
1.5 The Problem of Multi-Located Intrinsics
Those acquainted with contemporary metaphysics might worry that 
I’ve accidentally gone awry. The above discussion is reminiscent of the 
problem of temporary intrinsics: if a piece of wood, W, is round in the 
morning and I shave it down so that it’s square in the evening then “W is 
both round and square” is true.11 But we don’t take from this that there’s 
a true contradiction. Instead, we conclude that certain fundamental meta-
physical facts, which don’t have a contradictory form, are true—e.g., that 
W has a round temporal part and a square temporal part; or, W is round 
related to one time and square related to another. MH seems similar, and 
will—so the thinking goes—demand a more fundamental fact—e.g., that 
Marty has two temporal slices that exist at the same time, one 4' tall and 
one 6' tall; or that Marty is 4' tall relative to one region of space and 6' tall 
relative to another;12 or that Marty is 4' tall relative to one personal time 
and 6' tall relative to another (where we use “personal time” as Lewis 
11David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 202–205.
12Hudson, “Multiple Location and Singular Location Resurrection,” 99.
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does).13 In any case, whatever story is told, the objection would be that 
when we understand the deeper metaphysical story, we won’t worry 
about MH—similarly for IK.
I admit there’s a parallel between temporary and multi-located in-
trinsics but, interesting as the problem of multi-located intrinsics might 
be, discussion of it here erroneously changes the subject. Consider what 
Lewis says about the original problem of temporary intrinsics:
It is not a solution just to say how very commonplace and indubitable it is 
that we have different shapes at different times. To say that is only to insist—
rightly—that it must be possible somehow.14
So it’s true that W is round at one time and square at another time but, says 
Lewis, this fact isn’t pertinent as it’s not a good explanation, qua funda-
mental metaphysics, of the apparent contradiction. However, it is pertinent 
to this paper for, just as we acknowledge that it is non-contradictory that W 
can be round at one time and square at another (but then demand a meta-
physical explanation of it in fundamental terms) we should acknowledge 
that it is non-contradictory that one version of Marty is 4' tall and another 
is 6' ft tall (but add that this fact is merely, not fundamentally, true—that is, 
finding a deeper, metaphysical explanation of it is a task which remains). 
This acknowledgement is all we need for the purpose of this paper, as the 
deeper metaphysical explanation is irrelevant given the subject matter of 
this paper. When offering explanatory theories, and when dispelling mys-
teries, it is sufficient to only have true sentences feature in such theories, 
rather than the theory consisting solely of fundamentally true sentences. 
And this makes sense, for whatever deeper metaphysical explanation is 
eventually provided, we’ll still accept that sentences like “W is round at 
one time and square at another” are true and, similarly, that it’ll still be 
true that one version of Marty is 4' tall and another 6' tall. Those sentences’ 
admitting of a more fundamental metaphysical explanation—that is, 
their being merely, not fundamentally, true—is by the by. Consider: lest 
advancements in most disciplines come to a halt, people who don’t know 
how to resolve the problem of temporary intrinsics (i.e., everyone except, 
perhaps, a select few metaphysicians) needn’t stop advancing theories 
that require objects to change their intrinsic properties. Even if some meta-
physical conundrum is connected with change, we shouldn’t stop using 
facts involving objects having different properties at different times in 
our theories! Similarly, if God were multi-located, we can use this fact to 
show how the prima facie contradictory IK can nonetheless be true (albeit 
merely true) even while acknowledging that some deeper, metaphysical 
13Lewis, “The Paradoxes of Time Travel.” See also Carroll, “Self Visitation, Traveller Time, 
and Compatible Properties.” Leftow appears to relativise to personal times, but denies that 
Marty would be 4' tall at the external time (externally) simultaneous to the personal time he 
is 4' relative to (Leftow, “A Latin Trinity,” 107), so appears to instead endorse the Deviant 
Stature Approach.
14Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 204.
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truth stands to be uncovered at a later date. Not having that deeper, meta-
physical explanation presently to hand doesn’t prevent us from dispelling 
some of the mystery of the Trinity—in particular, showing how multi-
location permits IK to be true without bringing about a contradiction. As 
long as we can get our head around time travel stories (which millions 
of sci-fi film aficionados agree that we can) then statements like IK will 
end up being only as mysterious as those situations (which I count as a 
victory). Thus my move here mirrors the one that I made concerning ver-
sions: genuine progress can made concerning the Doctrine of the Trinity 
even if we remain ignorant of some of the fundamental metaphysical facts 
involved in that explanation (i.e., those concerning multi-located intrin-
sics and/or the metaphysics of versions).15
II. The Trinity and Modalism
2.1 Modalism
The above shows how multi-location can solve problems with IK, but com-
paring God to time travellers does nothing to show how there can be one 
God and yet three Divine People. We might meet Marty’s younger self, his 
sixteen-year-old self and his future seventy-year-old self all at once, but 
we’d only mistakenly believe they were three people—it is, in fact, just one 
person we’re meeting three times over. The analogue position concerning 
the Trinity is Modalism: the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are one being 
who appears to have three different “modes” (as, say, Superman/Clark 
Kent does) that we mistake as three different people. I assume, along with 
most Christian philosophers, that we should avoid Modalism.
Solve this by leaving behind time travel stories and focusing solely on 
multi-location. Time travel cases are merely heuristic devices to help us 
get a grip on what multi-location involves—namely that multi-location 
is possible and that statements like MH/IK are true—but they are not the 
only scenarios according to which multi-location occurs.
2.2 Multi-location without Time Travel
First, let’s understand how to have multi-location without time travel. 
It’s a standard meme in contemporary metaphysics to accept a Humean-
esque combinatorial principle whereby (roughly) every combination of 
objects and fundamental properties/relations is possible. If, as seems rea-
sonable, exact location is a fundamental relation, it follows that any object 
could bear the exact location relation to any plurality of regions (Sider has 
15This isn’t to say that the problem of multi-located intrinsics isn’t interesting, although 
I doubt the extant solutions work: temporal parts can’t play the role because, as I’ve argued 
elsewhere, one cannot get a workable definition of “temporal part” in a time travel scenario 
(“Temporal parts and time travel,” Erkenntnis 74 [2011], 225–240); nor does Hudson’s rela-
tivising to spacetime regions help as there could be a time travelling boson such that two 
versions of it with incompatible spins superpose. Nonetheless, the problem does cast some 
light on the associated problem with temporary intrinsics. For instance assuming one expects 
the same answer for both the problem of temporary intrinsics and multi-located intrinsics, 
presentism is no longer on the table as it doesn’t solve the problem of multi-located intrinsics. 
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presented a similar argument).16 If we deny that exact location is a funda-
mental relation, I nonetheless suggest that what fundamental relation(s) 
it derives from can, themselves, be recombined to permit multi-location. 
There’s seemingly no demand that the recombined scenarios involve time 
machines (indeed, such a demand would be an anti-Humean necessary 
connection!).
Certainly there are already putative examples of multi-location without 
time travel in Christian theology. The Eucharist, where Christ becomes 
present on the altar, and therefore is exactly located at many altars simul-
taneously, is one case. Supporters of this understanding of the Eucharist 
include Ockham,17 Suárez,18 and Thomas More.19 Bilocated saints provide 
a second example. For instance, St. Drogo was seen simultaneously at-
tending Sunday mass and toiling in the fields—he was miraculously 
located in two places at once.20 (Other examples of Saints capable of bi-
location include Clement, Francis of Assis, Anthony of Padua, Francis 
Xavier, Joseph Cupertino, Martin de Porres, and Alphonsus Liguori21 as 
well as Philip Neri.22)
Once we separate multi-location from time travel, we should accept 
that patterns of exact location instantiation can be fixed in anyway consis-
tent with whatever Humean principle of recombination we take to be true. 
So God (being omnipotent) can fix the relations however he wants—just 
as long as the pattern that results is logically possible. Let us turn to how 
this can solve the problem of the Trinity.
2.3 Avoiding Modalism
With this in mind, Modalism can be avoided. Start with a scenario involving 
multi-location without time travel, e.g., one involving a bilocated Saint 
like St. Drogo, who ends up (for a period of his life) being exactly located 
at two different regions. Drogo has prima facie contradictory properties 
16Ted Sider, “Parthood,” The Philosophical Review 116 (2007), 52–53. See also Cody Gilmore, 
“Location and Mereology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition) 
ed. Zalta, section 6.2. Online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/location-
mereology/. 
17S. Francis Clark, Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Reformation (London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 1960), 320. According to Francis Clark, Ockham believed that the ability to multi-locate 
was dependent upon Christ becoming point-sized. Thomas Flint suggested to me that this 
might be because of the standard belief that the whole of Christ is located in each part of 
the consecrated host—if “located” meant “exactly located,” then Christ would need to be 
point-sized.
18P. Durbin, “Bilocation,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia (Palatine, IL: Jack Heraty & Associ-
ates, 1967). 
19Walter Gordon, “A Scholastic Problem in Thomas More’s Controversy with John Frith,” 
Harvard Theological Review 69 (1976), 131–149.
20Anon. “Saint of the Week.” Catholic Herald, 16th April 2010, 18.
21J. Aumann, “Bilocation, Mystical,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia (Palatine, IL: Jack Hearty 
& Associates, 1967).
22F. Cross and E. Livingstone, eds., The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd edi-
tion (Oxford: OUP, 1997).
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such as simultaneously standing in the field and sitting in Church, or si-
multaneously desiring to be in the Church because it’s too hot in the field 
and desiring to be in the field because it’s too hot in the Church.
But if different versions of a substance can differ a little, they could 
differ a lot. Imagine someone multi-located from the beginning of their life 
to the end (rather than Drogo’s temporary mid-life multi-location). Call 
them Alex. Rather than Alex’s versions differing over trifling matters, such 
as toiling and sitting, the two versions of Alex are radically different: one 
is born a boy in America, who grows up to become a strapping man who 
toils in the fields, while the other is born a girl in Japan, who grows up to 
become a petite woman who plays the violin. Rather than differing over 
minor mental states, such as Drogo’s considering how hot he is, they differ 
radically. Each version is phenomenologically and mentally equivalent 
to, respectively, a boy growing up in America and a girl growing up in 
Japan—they never even realise they’re two different versions of the same 
substance.
I think it intuitive that, in this situation, Alex is two different people—
one a strapping American man, the other a petite young Japanese girl, and 
that “__ is the same person as __” is a two-place predicate that ends up 
functioning like “__is the same President as__” or “__ is the same CEO 
as__” whereby the relata can be numerically identical even though the 
two-place predicate fails to hold.23 Grover Cleveland was both the 22nd 
President of the USA and the 24th President of the USA—so the Cleve-
land of 1886 isn’t the same President as the Cleveland of 1894, but they 
are, nevertheless, numerically identical. To press the example, imagine the 
Cleveland of 1894 travelled in time to 1886; there would be two different 
Presidents who were nevertheless numerically identical at the same time. 
Or imagine that Bill Gates, who is currently CEO of Cascade Investment 
and not Microsoft, travels to 1975, when his former self was CEO of Micro-
soft but not Cascade Investment. They are the same entity but not the same 
CEO. If the 1975 shareholders of Microsoft needed their CEO to make a 
decision, then the future version of Bill Gates would not suffice—while he 
would be identical to the CEO of Microsoft, and even be a CEO himself, he 
wouldn’t be the same CEO as the one they needed. I claim that the scenario 
involving Alex demonstrates that “__ is the same person as __” functions 
in much the same way.24
23Notice that I retain the classical, absolute notion of identity—I am not relativising iden-
tity to a sortal (James Cain, “The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Logic of Relative Identity,” 
Religious Studies 25 [1989], 141–152; Peter Geach, “Identity,” Review of Metaphysics 21 [1967], 
3–12; Eddy M. Zemach, “In Defence of Relative Identity,” Philosophical Studies 26 [1974], 207–
218). My commitment—that in addition to classical identity, there are two-place predicates 
of sortal-relativised sameness—is innocuous.
24As being a CEO or being a President is a “metaphysically lightweight” matter, does that 
make personhood likewise? If it does, I don’t see what the problem is—the Doctrine of the 
Trinity isn’t committed to personhood being “metaphysically heavyweight.” All that is true 
is that the Doctrine involves serious theological matters, and not every serious theological 
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This would explain God’s multi-location. God the Father is exactly lo-
cated at Heaven. He then miraculously fixes the exact location relations 
just as He requires such that He is also exactly located at some place in 
space and time (namely, where the Son is). Then (depending upon your 
reading of filioque) either the Father (or, jointly, the Father and the Son) 
repeats this to get a third version of God (the Spirit). God is then, like Alex: 
three people but one multi-located entity.
2.4 Objections
Objection One: I am wrong to think Alex is two people. Alex is just one, 
very strange, person that I might—if I don’t know all the relevant choro-
logical facts—mistake for being two people. A stronger objector will say 
I’m mistaken about time travelling Cleveland/Gates as well, and that they 
are the same President/CEO.
Reply One: We need to be careful not to grind to a halt with simple in-
tuition bashing—me claiming that it is intuitive that Alex is two different 
people, my opponent claiming that it isn’t. First deal with the stronger ob-
jector. We can certainly coin predicates with the features I need. Even if you 
thought Cleveland/Gates were, when time travelling, still the same Presi-
dent and the same CEO, we could coin a new two-place predicate—“__ is 
the same President♦ as __” or “__ is the same CEO♦ as __”—which func-
tioned almost the same as the regular predicate except that, in the time 
travel cases given above, Cleveland/Gates are not the same President♦/
CEO♦. Predicates can be made up, and we can dictate how they function 
however we like; metaphysics cannot tyrannically oppress language! In-
deed, if time travel were commonplace, we would have excellent reason 
to talk solely about Presidents♦ (or what have you) in order to ensure that 
decisions of state were made by the version of the person democratically 
voted in rather than their future or past versions. Similarly, we can defi-
nitely coin a two-place predicate “__ is the same person♦ as __”.
Now the bone of contention is clear: does the two place predicate “__ is 
the same person as __” that appears in natural language mean “__ is the 
same person♦ as __” or does it mean some similar two-place predicate that 
doesn’t permit the numerically identical people to fail to be the same person 
(call that predicate “__ is the same person• as__”)? (Indeed, I just need the 
weaker claim that “__ is the same person♦ as __” is a legitimate disambigu-
ation that the authors of the Creeds were divinely inspired to pick out.) 
It’ll be hard to show that we pick out “__ is the same person• as__” rather 
than “__ is the same person♦ as __”, since the only situations in which we 
say someone is the same person• and not the same person♦ are situations 
involving multi-location. As such situations have not arisen, actual usage 
alone won’t prove my objector right.
matter is metaphysically heavyweight—e.g., facts about gender are not metaphysically 
heavyweight facts, but are crucial to very serious theological debates. 
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There are, however, reasons to think we pick out “__ is the same person♦ 
as __”. Personhood intuitively has something to do with immanent causal 
links. Immanent causal links are those causal links an entity bears to itself 
from one time to another whereby the way it is earlier on causes how it is 
later on. A heuristic is to imagine an indelible mark on a given entity: the 
entity immanently causes (some of) those things that continue to have the 
mark stamped on them. If you mark me, then (later in the day) the mark 
will remain, for my earlier self is immanently causally connected to my 
later self. It’s common to believe (as, e.g., Leftow does)25 that people must 
be immanently causally related to their later selves. Turn to time travelling 
Marty. Having stuck such a mark on past Marty’s forehead, he’ll have that 
self-same mark on his head in the future, so in the room in 1976 there’d be 
a child and a man with the same mark on their head. Given the immanent 
causal link, we have a strong indicator that they’re the same person. Multi-
located Alex, however, doesn’t have such connections, for a mark placed 
on either version’s head won’t appear on the other. The versions aren’t im-
manently causally related. So, as immanent causal connections are needed 
for personal identity, we should favour thinking “__is the same person 
as__” means “__ is the same person♦ as __” rather than “__ is the same 
person• as__”.
Objection Two: Alex is impossible for, while it has been conceded that 
multi-location is possible and minor differences between versions can 
arise (as they do with Drogo), that variation cannot be so broad that Alex 
is possible.
Reply Two: Certainly some cases of putative multi-location are impos-
sible—e.g., Alex could not be multi-located such that one version is a 
person and the other is a table. But this is best explained by the standard 
position that things have essential properties. Alex is essentially a person 
(and essentially not a well hewn hunk of inanimate mahogany) so every 
version must be a person, and the versions can vary only with regards 
to accidental properties. The person/table situation is now impossible, 
but Alex (who is not essentially an American field worker, not essentially 
male, etc.) only has varying accidental properties and is possible.
For it to be a problem, there must be a competing principle that 
permitted scenarios already conceded (i.e., Marty and Drogo) and yet ex-
cluded Alex. The only alternative I can think of is to say that, necessarily, 
each stage of an object must be immanently causally inter-related. This 
rules out Alex (and multi-located people-tables) since the stage of Alex 
that is a strapping man isn’t immanently causally related to the stage that 
is a petite violinist. And it would still allow for Marty (as all of his stages 
are immanently causally related) and St. Drogo (for his multi-located ver-
sions are immanently causally related to his singularly located past self 
and his singularly located future self). However, this alternative rallies 
against a popular position in metaphysics, namely diachronic unrestricted 
25Leftow, “A Latin Trinity,” 101.
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mereological composition. Given that thesis, there are objects like that 
which exists from 1990 to the end of 1991, such that at every moment it 
exists during 1990 it is composed of the atoms that make up some turnip 
and at every moment from 1991 it is composed of the atoms that make 
up Luciano Pavarotti.26 If we dabbed an indelible mark on the turnip in 
1990, then that mark won’t turn up on Pavarotti a year later—there are no 
immanent causal links between that gerrymandered object’s earlier stages 
and later stages. Nonetheless, it’s a popular metaphysical position to think 
it’s a bona fide object, and that there can be one, numerically identical 
thing throughout, even without such immanent causal ties. So immanent 
causal inter-relatedness appears to be too strong a condition to demand 
all objects meet. (Some people disagree about exactly this—for instance, 
Balashov thinks immanent causation is intimately tied to composition27—
so there may yet be a problem; but such objections have not marginalised 
universalism, so my position will find broad appeal as it stands.)
2.5 Comparisons to Other Latin Views
My response is a Latin response: each Divine Person is numerically iden-
tical, yet somehow a different person. There are other Latin responses 
available, and this sub-section explains the benefits of my own theory 
versus those of competitors.
Leftow’s Latin response is the most pertinent, for it also uses time travel 
to respond to the problem of the Trinity. Some preliminary comparisons 
favour my account. Firstly, some worry that Leftow cannot escape the 
charge of Modalism.28 Given my account of how God is like Alex, no such 
problem plagues my account. Similarly, Leftow later alters his account 
such that the Divine Persons are a type of event, rather than a substance, 
which seems worrying.29 As my account identifies each person with the 
same substance—just like any other person—it doesn’t have this issue.
Nor do the comparative benefits of my account stop there. Leftow’s 
response to the problem of the Trinity is to be accomplished by drawing 
analogies with time travel. I drop the focus on time travel, and instead 
concentrate on multi-location, cashing out my theory purely in terms of 
God literally (and not analogically) being exactly located at multiple re-
gions. Unlike Leftow, I’m not telling you what God is like, I’m telling you 
how God is (or, as this is a defense of the Trinity, how God could literally 
be). It’s a theoretical virtue to provide a theory that says how things liter-
ally are rather than providing merely an analogical device, so my theory 
26Achille Varzi, “Perdurantism, Universalism, and Quantifiers,” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 81 (2003), 208–215.
27Yuri Balashov, “Restricted Diachronic Composition, Immanent Causality and Object-
hood: A Reply to Hudson,” Philosophical Papers 32 (2003), 23–30.
28Michael Rea, “The Trinity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, ed. Thomas 
Flint and Michael Rea (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 410–412.
29Brian Leftow, “Modes without Modalism,” in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. Peter van 
Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: OUP, 2007)
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delivers a better account than Leftow’s. (Compare: while it has pedagog-
ical value to be told that gravity works a bit like a heavy ball causing a 
dimple in a rubber sheet, the literal truth cashed by general relativity has 
more explanatory power.)
Indeed, it is this feature—giving a literal tale about how God is, rather 
than what He is like—which means you should favour my view over al-
ternatives. For instance, Morris claims that God might be analogous to a 
person with multiple personality disorder, while Merricks argues that the 
Trinity is more akin to situations involving commissurotomy.30 Both, then, 
tell you what God is like, rather than detailing how He literally is; my 
theory, again, has superior explanatory power by providing a literal, not 
merely analogical, explanation.
2.6 The Father’s Location
That is, of course, only if you agree that I’ve given a literal account. You 
might worry that it must still be analogical, for while the Son (and maybe 
the Spirit) is exactly located somewhere in space and time, the Father 
(and maybe the Spirit) is not, for He is eternally timeless and so located 
nowhere. In that case, I would have failed to give a literal explanation as 
the Father is not a multi-located version of God, and God would at best be 
merely analogous to multi-located Alex.
I deny this. Let’s (charitably) assume that the Father is a timeless, 
atemporal being. Even a timeless Father is literally, and not analogically, 
exactly located somewhere—that is, there is something to which He bears 
the “exact location” relation (being precisely the same relation that any 
concrete entity bears to a region of space). That something is a single 
point. That point is not a spatial point, nor a spatiotemporal point, nor a 
time; it is simply a point, unrelated by any spatiotemporal (or analogous) 
relation to anything else (including itself). But it is intrinsically identical 
to the points of spacetime—that point is not an item of a different onto-
logical category that we must add to our ontology just for the sake of my 
theory about the Father’s location (ergo, as I shall explain below, being a 
spacetime point, rather than simply a point, is an extrinsic property of a 
point). This point, like all other relata of the exact location relation, suf-
fices to serve as the relatum of the exact location relation the Father stands 
in. He is, then, literally located at something (albeit not a region of space 
or time).
You may doubt that such a thing is possible: how can a point fail to be 
spatiotemporal in any way, while still having something exactly located at 
it? To show how this is possible, we first need two lessons concerning the 
nature of points.
First Lesson: Treat our universe, u1, substantivally such that it’s a fusion 
composed of points related by spatial and temporal relations (relativistic 
30Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1991) and 
Trenton Merricks, “Split Brains and the Godhead,” in Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor 
of Alvin Plantinga, ed. Thomas Crisp et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2006).
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concerns are irrelevant here, so feign Newtonianism; similarly, substanti-
valism has only been assumed for purposes of exposition). Chorological 
relations relate entities to parts of that fusion e.g., I am exactly located at re-
gion r at t in u1. Next (following a paper I co-authored with Joseph Melia)31 
imagine a universe, u2, which is a duplicate of but one instant (e.g., t ) from 
u1. So u2 is only a single hyperplane of points that no longer stand in the 
earlier than, or later than, relations to any other hyperplane. Presumably, I 
nevertheless am still exactly located at r, for the other instants not existing 
at u2 doesn’t leave me untethered from space! Next imagine u3: a time-
less universe, which is a duplicate of u2 except that the points aren’t even 
related by simultaneity to one another. That u2 could possibly exist is a 
possibility is easy to grasp. If simultaneity is a fundamental relation then 
(using the same combinatorial principle deployed in §2.2) u3 is possible, 
for it is just u2 with instances of that fundamental relation dropped. If 
simultaneity isn’t fundamental, and instead derives from other temporal 
relations like “earlier than” or “later than,” then u2 is already identical to 
u3 for, as nothing is earlier than or later than anything else in u2, nothing 
is simultaneous with anything else either and it is a timeless universe. 
Alongside Sider, I believe that objects at such timeless universes nonethe-
less have the same intrinsic properties they otherwise would’ve had at 
the instant we’ve “carved out” using recombination (e.g., just as an object 
can be charged at a given instant, or coloured at a given instant, it can be 
timelessly charged or coloured at the timeless universe).32 Similarly, then, 
making a universe timeless doesn’t unhook me from space, so I am exactly 
located at r at u3.
Second Lesson: Imagine (solely for simplicity) a universe, u4, at which 
Chisholm is correct33 and people are microscopic—let’s say point sized—
entities. We can have a further universe, u5, consisting solely of those 
points I am exactly located at. Just as we could remove the other times 
from u1 and arrive at a timeless universe, u3, removing all spatial regions 
other than the one that point-sized Nikk is exactly located at leaves us 
with a non-spatial universe. There are still temporal relations between the 
points, though, so we’ve arrived at the caricature of Berkeley’s idealism: 
a world without space but with time. As with the above, the removal of 
the points makes not one jot of difference as to what region(s) point-sized 
Nikk bears the “exact location” relation to. So we can radically vary the 
relations between the points in a different manner, leaving chorological 
relations unchanged between what’s left.
Combine the two lessons and we can arrive at a universe where a person 
is exactly located at a point but where that point isn’t related by any spatial 
31Nikk Effingham and Joseph Melia, “Endurantism and Timeless Worlds,” Analysis 67 
(2007), 140–147.
32Ted Sider, Four-dimensionalism (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 99. 
33Roderick Chisholm, “Is There a Mind-Body Problem?,” in On Metaphysics, ed. Roderick 
Chisholm (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 126.
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or temporal relations to anything—including itself. It would be a timeless, 
non-spatial universe (so being a spatial point, spatiotemporal point, time 
etc. is, unsurprisingly, an extrinsic property that requires the point to be 
a relatum of a spatial, spatiotemporal, temporal etc. relation).34 And if we 
take the lessons seriously, the timeless, non-spatial nature of the point is 
no impediment to (timeless, non-spatial) people, e.g., the Father, being 
exactly located at it. So the Father can literally, not merely analogically, be 
exactly located at some such point. Our world, then, is composed of two 
disconnected fusions of points: one fusion is the spatiotemporal universe 
that we inhabit (and God is exactly located where the Son is) and the other 
is the single atemporal point at which God is exactly located (where the 
version of Him that is the Father is).35 So God is literally, not analogically, 
located somewhere.
2.7 A Brief Tangent: Non-temporally Relativised Multi-location
A final technicality remains (if you’re uninterested by technicalities, 
nothing is lost by skipping to section 3). There are two exact location rela-
tions: the triadic temporally relativised exact location relation introduced 
by ostension in section 1.2 (“Object __ is exactly located at spatial region __ 
at time __”) and a dyadic atemporal exact location relation (“Object __ is 
exactly located at spacetime region __”) where the latter holds between, 
e.g., perduring entities (if there be any) and spacetime regions, as well as 
between spacetime regions and themselves (at least if we assume space-
time regions are located at themselves, which is not unreasonable).36 Thus 
far we have exclusively discussed the former, in particular section 1.2’s 
time travel scenario demonstrates only the cogency of temporally rela-
tivised multi-location and does not clearly demonstrate the possibility of 
atemporal multi-location.37 When I have moved from the multi-location 
of Marty to the multi-location of a Godhead that has a version exactly 
located at a timeless, non-spatial fusion, I (at first glance) appear to now 
rely on atemporal multi-location, for as the Father’s location is timeless, 
you may think that the chorological relation the Father bears to it is atem-
poral. In short: I shifted to relying on the possibility of something I haven’t 
shown to be possible.
Deal with this by looking again at u1 and u3 where, in both universes, I 
argued that we should think I am exactly located at r. But in the timeless 
universe u3 should we then say that the relation in question is temporally 
34Effingham and Melia, “Endurantism and Timeless Worlds,” 144.
35This exercise also allows us to tell the difference between concrete timeless entities like 
God and abstract atemporal entities like numbers, transcendent universals, etc. (Lewis, On 
the Plurality of Worlds, 81–86), for now we can say that abstracta are the unlocated things and 
concreta are the located things, for even timeless entities like God are located at some point. 
Chorology, therefore, reveals to us the mark of concreteness.
36Parsons, “Theories of Location,” 224.
37Cf. Nikk Effingham, “Mereological Explanation and Time Travel,” Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy 88 (2010), 333–345.
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relativised exact location or atemporal exact location? If it’s atemporal 
exact location, then imagine a timeless universe, u6, which is an intrinsic 
duplicate just of that instant from 9 a.m. on the 5th November 1976 at 
which Marty is multi-located in the temporally relativised sense. If, at u3, 
I am atemporally exactly located at r, then just as Marty is exactly located 
at two regions at the same time in 1976, Marty will be atemporally exactly 
located at two regions at u6. So there would be an example of the possibility 
of atemporal multi-location (indeed others, such as Gibson and Pooley, al-
ready accept such a possibility).38 If, alternatively, we think that at u6 I bear 
the relation of temporally relativised exact location to r even though the 
universe is timeless, it transpires that it’s just a very badly named relation 
which sometimes doesn’t hold relative to any time. Instead it is either a 
relation with a variable adicity (so, at a timeless universe, becomes dyadic) 
or (if, like Sider you aren’t happy with such a proposal)39 the relatum that 
takes the place of that slot can be any fusion of points, not just a hyper-
plane identified with a time.40 In either case the original scenario of Marty 
time travelling demonstrates that this (badly named) relation can hold 
many-one. So God can be related to both the timeless, non-spatial point 
which the Father is to be located at and to the regions of space Christ 
is exactly located at, by the same (badly titled) relation of “temporally 
relativised” exact location (which, it transpires, sometimes holds in non-
temporal circumstances). No matter how we play it, God can be literally 
multi-located in the required sense.
III. Souls and the Afterlife
Multi-location can also help us achieve a version of substance dualism 
consistent with contemporary science. A sample of problems dualism 
faces includes: evidence that our brain is the origin of our body’s actions, 
and not some nonphysical soul; that our neural activity is so closely cor-
related with our mental states that the two must be the same;41 that just 
as there are problems with combining a timeless god with the theory of 
special relativity42 there will be problems with souls being in time but not 
in space. I do not deny that a standard Cartesian or Thomist style dualism 
could resolve these problems, nor that Christian materialism is a viable 
alternative.43 However, I think there is an interesting alternative to both. 
Rather than believing that the soul is in time but not space, we should 
38Ian Gibson and Oliver Pooley, “Relativistic Persistence,” Philosophical Perspectives 20 
(2006), 157–198.
39Sider, Four-dimensionalism, 99.
40Cf. Effingham and Melia, “Endurantism and Timeless Worlds,” 145.
41Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition (London: MIT Press, 1990), 
20; Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 2nd edition (Boulder: Westview, 2002), 196–198.
42William Lane Craig, “Divine Eternity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, 
ed. Thomas Flint and Michael Rea (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 149–151.
43Trenton Merricks, “The Resurrection of the Body and Life Everlasting,” in Reason For 
The Hope Within, ed. Michael Murray (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Com-
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believe that it is in neither, instead locating it at some timeless, non-spatial 
point (or fusion of such points).
Initially, this sounds crazy. The soul is that thing in which my com-
plex, changing mental states inhere and it’s difficult to see how I can have 
changing mental states if, in fact, I am atemporal. Even if we could ac-
count for the illusion of phenomenological change, we have a problem 
concerning widespread error. For example, I believe I am now writing a 
paper and am not now in pain from attending a dental appointment when I 
was 15. But one should say either that every fact about what goes on at any 
time is true now from the standpoint of an atemporal timeless region (ergo, 
I am wrong about not now being in pain—from the timeless standpoint 
I am now in pain!) or that no such fact is true now from that standpoint 
(ergo, I am wrong to believe I’m writing the paper now). Either ways, the 
theory implausibly commits us to believing there is widespread error in 
everyone’s belief structure. And, in any case, this theory does nothing to 
avoid the anti-dualist arguments from above (with the exception of the 
problem from special relativity, which is only an issue with regards to 
temporally located souls).
The view is less crazy, however, if I say I’m multi-located, such that 
there are two versions of me: one exactly located at an atemporal point, 
the other exactly located at the region(s) in space and time that the mate-
rialist says I am exactly located at. This means that one version of me is a 
physical thing and I can agree with the materialist that I am a biological 
entity, physically located in the universe. For each problem the materialist 
raises against dualism, I then rely upon the same response to it that ma-
terialists do. For example, when the materialist says that the reason my 
body moves is not because of a soul sending magic rays to move my limbs 
but because my brain causes my limbs to move, I agree. My brain does 
make my body move (and my soul does not)—while a version of me is an 
immaterial timeless soul, I deny that the “soul version” is sending signals 
of any sort to the material world, or interacting in any way with my body, 
for the brain-version of me does all the work in that regard. Just think 
back to Alex: what causes the violinist to play the violin is one thing (the 
brain of the violinist-version of Alex) even though Alex has other mental 
states—those belonging to the version of Alex as a strapping young man—
that are causally isolated from making the violinist version of Alex do 
anything. So when the materialist argues that the reason my brain states 
cohere with my mental states is because I am my brain, I agree! I am my 
brain (although, you should note, I am also a nonphysical soul) just as 
Marty is his younger self (and also his older self). And so on for all of the 
objections generally levelled against substance dualism. My theory is still, 
however, a substance dualist theory as I add that I am also exactly located 
pany, 1999); Peter van Inwagen, “The Possibility of Resurrection,” The International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 9 (1978), 114–121.
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at the timeless point. So I am also a soul, which is nonphysical, and so 
substance dualism is true.
Assuming that it makes sense to say that things can have mental states 
at a given instant (making mental states comparable to instantaneous ac-
celerations), which, if you’re happy with the idea of a timeless Father, is 
a fair assumption, then I will have the same mental states in u3 as I had 
at some given instant in u1. In general, then, entities that are timelessly 
and spacelessly located can have mental states. So imagine that God sees 
what I am like at the end of my mortal life and takes a “snapshot” of my 
mental states at that last instant. (Indeed, given section 2.3, for my soul 
to be the same person as me we’ll need to add that the last slice stands 
in immanent causal connections to my soul. This is not problematic, and 
moreover bears out 1 Corinthians 15:46 which says that the natural body 
is prior to the soul, for my theory makes it causally prior to the soul.) 
When God multi-locates me, He ensures that the version that is exactly 
located at the timeless, non-spatial point has those mental states. God 
could even alter them slightly to reflect His judgement about my temporal 
life. Maybe I’m timelessly—dare we say eternally—basking in God’s glory, 
or timelessly—dare we say eternally—feeling remorse and suffering pun-
ishment without needing there to be beth-one years of devils poking me 
with pointy sticks. (And if you demand a literal resurrection, just maintain 
that God ensures that the first slice of your resurrected brain has the same 
mental states, and is immanently caused by, your timeless soul.)
So I am physical and I am nonphysical; I am timely and I am timeless; I 
am eternal (in the sense of being timeless) even though I live for only a set 
amount of time. None of this is contradictory, in the same way that MH/IK 
are not contradictions. As made clear above, this theory will be compatible 
with all scientific discoveries concerning the mind. Of course, it requires 
things like timeless heavenly realms, which one may think are inconsistent 
with contemporary science, but a commitment to such things is a commit-
ment any Christian should have. Moreover, science not including things 
like a place for a timeless God (and the souls) to dwell is not worrisome in 
the way that dualism’s problem of accounting for neuroscience’s success 
(or its apparent inconsistency with special relativity etc.) is worrisome. 
The more serious latter worries are ameliorated by my theory.
This theory does undermine most arguments for dualism. For instance, 
we could no longer argue that substance dualism was true because matter 
and mere neural activity cannot be responsible for qualia. But this is a 
positive point, not a negative point, for the type of Christian I am trying 
to attract to this theory, namely one who feels overwhelmingly attracted 
to the philosophical/scientific virtues of physicalism but also feels pressed 
into thinking substance dualism is true because of scripture. They’ll be 
happy to give up on arguments for substance dualism that rely on such 
anti-physicalist sentiments. You might, then, wonder why we would be-
lieve such a version of dualism.
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The answer is that the theory manages to bear out the relevant por-
tions of scripture. There are many comparisons of sleep to being in the 
afterlife (e.g., 1 Thessalonians 13–15; 1 Corinthians 15:6, 20; Luke 8:52). 
Sleep can be characterised by a lack, but not a total lack, of consciousness 
and awareness, as well as the strange effect it has on how we perceive 
time. So if we were to try to convey the idea of a timeless existence, to say 
we are “sleeping” would be one way to gesture at it. Moreover, it’s now 
quite easy to square the claim in Jeremiah 51:39 that the wicked would 
be sent to a perpetual sleep with the standard position that everyone, 
including the wicked, will eventually be resurrected. Short of a strange 
super-task, if your afterlife were temporal, you could not perpetually 
sleep and then come back to wakefulness ready for the resurrection, so 
we have a tension. We can resolve this tension by treating the claim about 
sleeping in perpetuity to be a way of gesturing at the timeless nature of 
the afterlife, since your existence in the afterlife never expires so is, in a 
sense, perpetual. The wicked are immanently connected to their timeless 
soul, so when they die they enter a state of “perpetual sleep” and that 
soul is connected to their resurrected body, so they manage to “perpetu-
ally” sleep but still return to face judgement during the Resurrection. 
Thus it is that my proposed theory deals with this scriptural element 
perfectly (it also makes for an interesting alternative to the theory of 
psychopannychism,44 which is an alternative method for accounting for 
Biblical allusions to a sleep/death connection). Finally, consider Davis 
who argues that we should believe that we go to an afterlife upon dying 
to bear out Luke 23:43, wherein Christ says that the criminal who died 
alongside him would today be in paradise (rather than having to wait 
around until Judgement Day).45 Given my theory, the Father knows how 
the criminal is at the last instant of his existence and ensures that he’s 
multi-located in the timeless, non-spatial afterlife that is paradise. Jesus’s 
words now come out as true, for if ψ is true and ψ is a timeless truth then 
“It is now the case that ψ” is true (e.g., it’s now the case that 2 + 2 = 4). 
The criminal is in timeless paradise, so it’s true for Jesus to say that he is, 
today, in paradise. Indeed it’d be correct to say he was yesterday and last 
week (but, doubtlessly, there’s little reason to explain such metaphysical 
nuances to a dying man, so no wonder Jesus stuck simply with “today”!). 
When it comes to claims that Jesus, or whomever, has not yet ascended 
into Heaven (e.g., John 20:17) this, too, is compatible with what I say. 
We can take that sentence as being broadly elliptical for saying that the 
current time slice of you isn’t the one that God has decided to replicate in 
the timeless, non-spatial realm, and that it is a later time slice of you that 
God has replicated the mental states of.
44Oscar Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? (London: Epworth 
Press, 1958).
45Stephen T. Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1993), 88. 
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So, my version of dualism manages to avoid the usual objections to 
dualism and manages not only to be compatible with scripture but also 
in certain cases (e.g., Jeremiah 51:39) to resolve prima facie tensions within 
scripture. Exactly why God would set things up this way—and why 
He would have you be a multi-located entity as so described—I won’t 
comment on in this paper; nevertheless, I think this interesting spin on 
substance dualism is worth noting.46
University of Birmingham
46While separate from the theory proposed above, it’s worth pursuing in this footnote 
how issues raised in this paper can explain Lowe-style causal interactionism whereby the 
causal chains in the universe are all purely physical but souls are responsible for the chains 
themselves (Jonathan Lowe, “The Problem of Psychophysical Causation,” Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 70 [1992], 263–276). Anecdotally, people have a hard time understanding 
this. But imagine a two-temporally dimensional world of time and hypertime. Imagine, per 
impossible, that God and the souls all exist at but one time at hypertime T1. They jointly cause 
lots of physical things to appear, in certain arrangements, at hypertemporal instant T2, at 
each of the times during T2. Imagine a second world where the hypertemporal relations are 
recombined away, but leave the causal relations. That leaves you with a Lowe-style world 
where souls and God are jointly responsible for the purely physical causal chains. While this 
is not my theory of the soul, it is noteworthy.
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